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ABSTRACT
The study considers an environmental R&D subsidy in a mixed
duopoly with spillovers. Public and private firms compete in envir-
onmental R&D investments and the government sets the subsidy
to environmental R&D. This study examines three cases: (a) the
public firm cares for the environment and maximises the welfare;
(b) it does not care for the environment and maximises the sum
of consumer and producer surpluses net of subsidy; and (c) it is
privatised and maximises its own profit. The main findings are as
follows: 1) the optimal subsidies are positive in all three cases; 2)
the optimal subsidy always increases with spillovers in case (a),
but it may decrease with spillovers in cases (b) and (c); 3) the
optimal subsidy is higher in case (a) than in case (b) if the serious-
ness of environmental damage generated by pollution is small,
however the opposite case may be the case if it is large; 4) the
use of subsidy results in higher total R&D and lower environmen-
tal damage in all three cases; 5) privatisation lowers optimal sub-
sidy (or environmental damage) no matter whether the public
firm cares for the environment or not; and 6) privatisation reduces
welfare if the public firm cares for the environment, but may raise
welfare if it does not care for the environment.
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With the global climate warming1 and environmental pollution increasing, people are
paying more attention to reducing pollution and improving environmental quality.
Thus, most countries encourage the development and promotion of clean technolo-
gies. Since the market cannot internalise the environmental damages, the intervention
of the government (regulator) is necessary (Ben Youssef & Dinar, 2011). In order to
reduce pollution, the environmental R&D subsidy is a commonly used environmental
regulatory instrument by the government. In many countries, the highly polluting
industries usually include both public and private firms.2 For example, in the steel
industry of China, there are both public firms (e.g., Baosteel Group Co.) and private
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firms (e.g., Shagang Group Co.). The Chinese government has subsidised the steel
firms (whether they are public or private firms) that are in favour of eliminating
backward production capacity in environmental protection equipment and techno-
logical transformation.
Environmental R&D activities have significant externalities (i.e., the spillover effect)
in some industries.3 When the spillovers in environmental R&D occur, a firm benefits
not only from its own R&D effort but also from its rivals’ efforts.4 This may affect
the environmental R&D subsidy policy of the government. Thus, the first objective of
this study is to examine the effect of spillovers on the optimal subsidy to environ-
mental R&D. Empirical evidence indicates that the public firms’ concern for the
environment differs widely across countries (Pal & Saha, 2015). For instance, Chang
et al. (2015) analyse data from Chinese firms in some highly polluting industries and
find that public firms tend to invest more in pollution reducing activities than private
firms, while Hettige, Huq, Pargal, and Wheeler (1996) and Ohori (2006) point out
that several public firms showed much higher pollution intensities than private firms
in some other developing countries.5 A public firm’s attitude towards the environ-
ment obviously impacts its environmental R&D behaviour. When the government
formulates the environmental R&D subsidy policy, it should take into account the
public firms’ environmental attitude. Thus, our second objective is to analyse how the
environmental attitude of a public firm affects the R&D subsidy policy. Today, privat-
isation (or partial privatisation) of public firms has been a feature of government pol-
icy in many developing as well as developed countries (Xu, Cho, & Lee, 2016). Does
the decision whether to privatise a public firm affect the environmental R&D subsidy
policy, environmental R&D, environmental damage and welfare? The third objective
of this study is thus to investigate the effect of privatisation on them in
mixed markets.
Environmental R&D subsidy is an important regulatory instrument in encouraging
the development of cleaner technologies. It is being given more attention by govern-
ments in many polluting industries including those characterised by mixed oligopo-
lies.6 However, this issue has not received much attention in the literature on mixed
oligopoly, which is our focus of the present paper. The main purpose of this paper is
to introduce the environmental R&D subsidy into a mixed duopoly and examine the
optimal subsidy under different environmental concerns of a public firm.7 This study
first considers the following two scenarios: (a) the public firm cares for the environ-
ment; and (b) it does not. Next, it considers the case where the public firm is priva-
tised (case c) to analyse the impact of privatisation on subsidy.
The main findings are as follows. Firstly, we find that the optimal subsidy is posi-
tive and always increases with spillovers in case (a). However, it may decrease with
spillovers in case (b). This is different from the result that the spillovers always have
a positive effect on the cost-reducing R&D subsidy in a mixed duopoly (Gil-Molto,
Poyago-Theotoky, & Zikos, 2006, 2011). Secondly, we suggest that the government
should provide higher subsidy in case (a) than in case (b) if the seriousness of envir-
onmental damage is small, but the opposite may be the case if it is large. Thirdly, we
show that the use of subsidy raises the private firm’s R&D and total R&D8 and
improves environmental quality in both (a) and (b) but it reduces (does not affect)
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the public firm’s R&D in case (a) (case (b)).9 Fourthly, privatisation leads to lower
optimal subsidy regardless of the public firm’s environmental attitude. This result is
consistent with most literature on cost-reducing R&D subsidy in a mixed oligopoly
(Gil-Molto et al., 2006, 2011; Gil-Molto, Poyago-Theotoky, Rodrigues-Neto, & Zikos,
2018). Finally, we find that under a policy of providing optimal subsidy to environ-
mental R&D, after privatisation the total R&D and welfare reduce in case (a) and
they may rise in case (b). However, privatisation always leads to lower environmental
damage in both case (a) and case (b). Gil-Molto et al. (2006, 2011) find that when
the optimal subsidy to cost-reducing R&D is provided, the total R&D and welfare
always decrease after privatisation. Obviously, our results in case (b) are different
from theirs. Moreover, the effect of privatisation on the total R&D, environmental
damage and welfare could be different when other environmental policies are used.
For instance, if an environmental tax is employed, privatisation may damage the
environment (Pal & Saha, 2015; Tsai, Wang, & Chiou, 2016; Xu et al., 2016; Haruna
& Goel, 2019) and it always leads to reductions in the total R&D (Haruna & Goel,
2019) and welfare (Tsai et al., 2016).
The remainder of this paper is organised as follows. Section 2 gives a brief litera-
ture review and section 3 describes the basic model. Section 4 (section 5) solves the
optimal R&D subsidy before (after) privatisation of the public firm. Section 6 makes
a comparison of optimal R&D subsidy, environmental damage, welfare and others in
sections 4 and 5. The final section presents conclusions.
2. Literature review
More and more countries recognise the importance of innovation in economic
growth and promotion of international competitiveness. The use of subsidies to R&D
is an important policy for the government to encourage firms to increase their R&D
investments (Yang & Nie, 2015; Sekuła, 2017).10 In recent years, the R&D subsidy in
a mixed oligopoly, where private and public firms compete in R&D, has become an
increasingly active field of interest.
Some scholars are concerned about the cost-reducing R&D subsidy policy in
mixed oligopolies. Gil-Molto et al. (2006, 2011) investigate the use of R&D subsidy
in a mixed duopoly with spillovers and show that the optimal subsidy is positive
and increases with spillovers, but it is higher compared with a private duopoly.
When there is more than one private firm in a mixed oligopoly, Gil-Molto et al.
(2018) find that the optimal subsidy is also higher than in a private oligopoly. Lee
et al. (2017) analyse R&D and output subsidies in a mixed duopoly and find that a
R&D subsidy is welfare-inferior to an output subsidy, but Lee and Muminov (2017)
give an agreement-based incentive R&D subsidy to internalise spillovers and obtain
the opposite conclusion, and Kesavayuth and Zikos (2013) show that a R&D subsidy
is socially superior (inferior) to an output subsidy if the spillovers are high (low).
Moreover, Zikos (2007) and Lee and Tomaru (2017) investigate the policy mix of
R&D and output subsidies and show that a tax on R&D with a subsidy on output
can achieve the first-best allocation. These studies focus on the cost-reducing R&D
subsidy in a mixed oligopoly. However, all of them do not consider the subsidy to
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environmental R&D and the effect of the public firm’s environmental concerns
to it.
As people attach importance to the environment and enhance the awareness of
environmental protection, more mixed oligopoly studies incorporate environment
issues into their analysis. One aspect relates to environmental R&D in mixed markets.
Some studies reveal the influence of corporate social responsibility (CSR), privatisa-
tion and technological efficiency on public or private firms’ environmental R&D.
Lambertini and Tampieri (2010) find that the presence of a CSR firm may induce the
other firms to invest in green technology in a Cournot oligopoly with pollution. Tsai
et al. (2016) show that privatisation cannot induce public and private firms to carry
out more R&D concurrently and it may even curb both firms’ R&D. Haruna and
Goel (2019) think that the public firm has positive emissions-reducing R&D effort,
but whether emissions reduction of the private firm is positive or zero depends on
the efficiency of R&D technology. However, they do not examine the impact of subsi-
dies on environmental R&D.
The second aspect is the literature on environmental policy (or regulation) in a
mixed oligopoly.11 Some scholars study how privatising a public firm affects the
environmental tax policy and its effects on the environmental quality and welfare
under such a policy. Barcena-Ruiz and Garzon (2006) show that privatisation results
in higher environmental tax and lower environmental damage. Pal and Saha (2015)
think that the optimal privatisation damages the environment most if the public firm
is unconcerned about the environment, but privatisation improves the environment if
it cares for it. Tsai et al. (2016) find that privatisation may lead to a poorer environ-
ment if the imposition of environmental tax inadequately internalises pollution exter-
nality, and it reduces overall social welfare. Some other scholars investigate the effect
of privatisation on the optimal environmental regulation (Naito & Ogawa, 2009) and
on the welfare effects of emission tax and emission quota (Kato, 2010) and find that
they critically depend on the degree of privatisation. These studies mainly focus on
regulatory instruments such as environmental tax. However, the environmental R&D
subsidy as an important regulatory instrument in mixed markets is neglected, which
is the focus of the present paper.
3. The model
Consider an industry with two firms (firm 0 and firm 1). Firm 0 is entirely public (or
privately) owned and firm 1 is entirely privately owned. They produce a homoge-
neous good. The inverse demand function is linear and given as follows:
PðQÞ ¼ aQ (1)
In (1), Q denotes the total output (Q ¼ q0 þ q1); qi (i ¼ 0, 1) is the firm i’s output;
and a  Q. We assume that both firms have the following production cost functions:
CðqiÞ ¼ cqi þ q2i (i ¼ 0, 1).12
Production processes in both firms generate environmental pollution. For simpli-
city, we assume that producing one unit of output causes one unit of pollution.
However, firms can reduce emissions by undertaking environmental R&D.13 Both
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firms use end-of-pipe technology in pollution abatement.14 The emission generated
by firm i after environmental R&D is as follows:15 ei ¼ qixibxj, where xi is the
environmental R&D effort for firm i and b (b 2 ½0, 1) is the degree of spillovers.
Since there exist knowledge spillovers in environmental R&D, a firm can receive ben-
efits not only from its own environmental R&D effort but also its competitor’s effort.
The environmental R&D expenditure for firm i is CðxiÞ ¼ 12 x2i . The total environmen-




 2 ¼ d
2
Qð1þ bÞX½ 2 (2)
In (2), E denotes the total emission (E ¼ e0 þ e1); X denotes the total R&D effort
(X ¼ x0 þ x1); and d (d>0) measures the seriousness of environmental damage gener-
ated by pollution,17 which is assumed to be not very large.18 Using (2), we get the fol-
lowing marginal environmental damage D0ðEÞ ¼ dE.
The government subsidises the environmental R&D level of each firm.19 Each firm
receives a subsidy s per unit of environmental R&D output, Si ¼ sxi. Thus, the profit
function for firm i is:20
pi ¼ PðQÞqiCðqiÞCðxiÞ þ Si
¼ PðQÞqiðcqi þ q2i Þ
1
2
x2i þ sxi, i ¼ 0, 1
(3)
The social welfare is defined as the sum of consumer surplus (CS) and producer
surplus (PS ¼ p0 þ p1) net of environmental R&D subsidies (S0 þ S1) and total envir-
onmental damage (DðEÞ):













Notice that the environmental R&D subsidy cancels out in the social welfare
function when we aggregate (see (4)). This implies that the subsidy to environ-
mental R&D has no direct effect on the social welfare. However, it may have
indirect effect on the social welfare via two firms’ output or environmen-
tal R&D.
The objective of the public firm is assumed to maximise the social welfare
in most mixed oligopoly literature on the environment. However, several
scholars point out that the public firm may not share the same objectives as
the government.21 Empirical evidence shows that the public firms’ concern for
the environment differs widely across countries (Hettige et al., 1996; Ohori,
2006; Chang et al., 2015). We assume that the public firm’s objective function
is as follows:22
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X ¼ CSþ PSðS0 þ S1ÞkDðEÞ ¼
ðQ
0
PðzÞdzCðq0ÞCðq1ÞCðx0ÞCðx1ÞkDðEÞ, k 2 f0, 1g
(5)
In (5), if k ¼ 1, the public firm cares about the environmental damages, and its
objective is to maximise the social welfare. This case corresponds to the standard case
in which the objective of the public firm is the same as the government. However, if
k ¼ 0, the public firm is not concerned about environmental damages. In this case,
its objective is to maximise the sum of consumer and producer surpluses net of
environmental subsidy. This study will consider both scenarios to investigate how the
optimal environmental R&D subsidy may vary between two cases.23
In order to examine how privatisation of the public firm affects the optimal sub-
sidy to environmental R&D, we also consider the private duopoly case, in which firm
0 is also entirely privately owned. In this case, both firm 0 and firm 1 pursue max-
imum profits.
The game has three stages. In the first stage, the government determines the envir-
onmental R&D subsidy rate (s) to maximise social welfare. In the second stage, each
firm decides on the environmental R&D level (xi) simultaneously and independently.
In the third stage, firms choose the output (qi) simultaneously and independently.
4. Mixed duopoly
In this section, firm 0 is entirely public owned, whereas firm 1 is entirely privately
owned. According to the public firm’s attitude towards the environment, we consider
the following two scenarios: one in which the public firm cares about environmental
damages (i.e., k ¼ 1) (case (a)) and the other where it does not (i.e., k ¼ 0) (case (b)).
The public and private firms pursue different objectives in this section. The objective
of the public firm is to maximise social welfare (the sum of consumer and producer
surpluses net of environmental subsidy) if it cares (does not care) for the environ-
ment as shown in (5). However, the objective of the private firm is to maximise its
profits as shown in (3) when i ¼ 1. As usual, we solve the game by the back-
ward induction.
4.1. Production
First, we examine the final stage. In stage 3, the public (private) firm determines pro-
duction level to maximise social welfare (5) (profit (3)). Differentiating (5) (profit (3))








¼ PðQÞ þ P0ðQÞq1C0ðq1Þ
¼ mq04q1 ¼ 0
(7)
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In (6) and (7), m ¼ ac.24 Solving above conditions gives:
qt0ðx0, x1Þ ¼
ð3kdÞmþ 4kdð1þ bÞðx1 þ x0Þ
11þ 3kd (8)
qt1ðx0, x1Þ ¼
ð2þ kdÞmkdð1þ bÞðx1 þ x0Þ
11þ 3kd (9)
Note that superscript t ¼ a (t ¼ b) if k ¼ 1 (k ¼ 0). Using (8) and (9), we carry





















oX ¼ 0. These results show that
in the mixed duopoly regime, the public (private) firm’s output increases (decreases)
with its own (its rival’s or the total) environmental R&D effort if k ¼ 1, whereas the
public (private) firm’s output does not depend on them if k ¼ 0. The reason is as fol-
lows. For k ¼ 1, an increase in X (x0 or x1) reduces the effective marginal cost of the
public firm (i.e., a decrease in C0ðq0Þ þ D0ðEÞ), so that the public firm has a stronger
incentive to produce, while the private firm decreases its output due to the strategic
substitution (b can strengthen this effect).25 In addition, for k ¼ 0, an increase in X
(x0 or x1) does not affect the effective marginal cost of both firms, so that the firms’
environmental R&D investments play no role in changing the production allocation.
4.2. R&D
We proceed to consider the R&D stage. By substituting (8) and (9) into the objective
functions of two firms (3) and (5), we derive the following first-order conditions for
the firms’ optimal R&D decisions:
oXðx0, x1Þ
ox0












¼  4kdð1þ bÞð11þ 3kdÞ2 ð2þ kdÞmkdð1þ bÞðx1 þ x0Þ½  þ sx1 ¼ 0
(11)
Solving (10) and (11) yields:
xt0ðsÞ ¼
kdð1þ bÞf ð53þ 19kdÞð11þ 3kdÞ þ 8ð11þ 4kdÞkdð1þ bÞ2
 
mð121þ 43kdÞð11þ 3kdÞð1þ bÞsg
ð11þ 3kdÞ ð11þ 3kdÞ2 þ kdð121þ 39kdÞð1þ bÞ2
 
(12)
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xt1ðsÞ ¼
ð11þ 3kdÞ2 þ kdð121þ 43kdÞð1þ bÞ2
 
ð11þ 3kdÞs4kdð1þ bÞ ð2þ kdÞð11þ 3kdÞ þ 2ð11þ 4kdÞkdð1þ bÞ2
 
m
ð11þ 3kdÞ ð11þ 3kdÞ2 þ kdð121þ 39kdÞð1þ bÞ2
 
(13)
Substituting (12) and (13) into (8) and (9), we obtain:
qt0ðsÞ ¼
ð3kdÞð11þ 3kdÞ þ ð33þ 7kdÞkdð1þ bÞ2
 
mþ 4kdð11þ 3kdÞð1þ bÞs
ð11þ 3kdÞ2 þ kdð121þ 39kdÞð1þ bÞ2 (14)
qt1ðsÞ ¼
ð2þ kdÞð11þ 3kdÞ þ 2ð11þ 4kdÞkdð1þ bÞ2
 
mkdð11þ 3kdÞð1þ bÞs
ð11þ 3kdÞ2 þ kdð121þ 39kdÞð1þ bÞ2
(15)
Note that to guarantee the firms’ R&D efforts, outputs and emissions are
not negative, s must satisfy s  s  s in this section, in




½ð11þ 3kdÞ þ 4kdð1þ bÞ½ð2þ kdÞð11þ 3kdÞ þ 2ð11þ 4kdÞkdð1þ bÞ2kdbð1þ
bÞ½ð53þ 19kdÞð11þ 3kdÞ þ 8ð11þ 4kdÞkdð1þ bÞ2
!
m
ð11þ 3kdÞf½kdð1þ bÞ þ ð11þ 3kdÞð11þ 3kdÞ þ kdð121þ 43kdÞð1 bÞð1þ bÞ2g
.
Then, the total environmental damage is calculated as:
DtðsÞ ¼ d
2
5 ð11þ 3kdÞ þ 2kdð1þ bÞ2
 
m11ð1þ bÞð11þ 3kdÞs
ð11þ 3kdÞ2 þ kdð121þ 39kdÞð1þ bÞ2
 !2
(16)
Lemma 1. In the mixed duopoly, (i) when the public firm cares about the environment,
the private (public) firm’s environmental R&D increases (decreases) with the subsidy,26
and the total environmental R&D increases with the subsidy; and (ii) when the public
firm does not care about the environment, the private firm’s (or the total) environmen-
tal R&D increases with the subsidy, and the public firm’s environmental R&D does not
depend on the subsidy.
Proof. See Appendix.
The government determines the subsidy rate at the first stage, and this subsidy
rate affects future environmental R&D investment of the private (or public) firm. The
private firm’s R&D effort increases with larger subsidy rate in both case (a) and case
(b), whereas the public firm’s R&D effort decreases with larger subsidy rate in case
(a) and is not affected by the subsidy in case (b). This effect plays a salient role
between the firms and the government.
The reason for Lemma 1 is as follows. In the first line of (10) ((11)), the term






marginal benefit of the public (private) firm from environmental R&D, whereas
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C0ðx0Þ (C0ðx1Þ) is the marginal cost. Since qti is independent from s (see (8) and (9)),
an increase in s definitely enhances the marginal benefit to the private firm, so that it
conducts more environmental R&D (for both k ¼ 1 and k ¼ 0). The same result does
not apply to the public firm. Since the subsidy is also a cost in the objective function
of the public firm (see (5)), this cancels out the positive effect of the subsidy. As a
result, the subsidy has only an indirect effect on the public firm’s environmental
R&D behaviour through the private firm’s environmental R&D.
In the linear demand model,27 for k ¼ 1 the increase in the private firm’s environ-
mental R&D contributes to a decrease in the public firm’s marginal benefit.
Accordingly, the public firm reduces its environmental R&D due to strategic substitu-
tion. However, for k ¼ 0, the increase in the private firm’s environmental R&D does
not affect the public firm’s marginal benefit, so that the public firm does not conduct
environmental R&D. In addition, for k ¼ 1, the increase in the private firm’s environ-
mental R&D level outweighs the decrease in the public firm’s level for all values of
b 2 ½0, 1. Thus, the total environmental R&D level always increases with the subsidy.28
For k ¼ 0, the total environmental R&D level obviously increases with the subsidy.29
Lemma 2. In the mixed duopoly, (i) when the public firm cares about the environment,
the public (private) firm’s output increases (decreases) with the subsidy, and the total
output increases with the subsidy; and (ii) when the public firm does not care about
the environment, the public (private) firm’s output and the total output do not depend
on the subsidy.
Proof. See Appendix.
The intuition for part (i) of Lemma 2 is the following. The subsidy has no direct
effect on social welfare (see (4)), so that it does not directly affect the public firm’s
output if it cares for the environment. The subsidy affects the public firm’s output via
the effect it exerts on the total environmental R&D output (see Footnote 23). Since
the total environmental R&D increases with the subsidy (see Lemma 1), the public
firm’s output increases as the subsidy increases if it cares for the environment.30 The
increase in the subsidy leads to an increase in the total environmental R&D and the
public firm’s output, which in turn leads to a decrease in the private firm’s output
due to strategic substitution (see Footnote 25). Because the positive effect of the sub-
sidy on the public firm’s output dominates the negative effect on the private firm’s
output, the total output increases with the subsidy.
The reason for part (ii) of lemma is that the subsidy affects the firms’ output via
the effect it exerts on the environmental R&D. When the public firm is unconcerned
about the environment, the environmental R&D has no effect on the private (or pub-
lic) firm’s output (see (8) and (9)). Thus, the public (or private) firm’s output and the
total output do not depend on the subsidy. Note that this result is different from that
in the case when the public firm cares about the environment. This implies that
whether the environmental R&D subsidy affects the public (or private) firm’s output
or not depends on the public firm’s environmental attitude in a mixed duopoly.
Lemma 3. In the mixed duopoly, regardless of whether the public firm cares about the
environment or not, the total environmental damage decreases with the subsidy.
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Proof. See Appendix.
The reason for this is as follows. If the public firm cares for the environment, two
effects are determining this result: (i) the subsidy will increase the total output (see
Lemma 2), which leads to an increase in the total environmental damage; and (ii) the
subsidy will increase the total environmental R&D (see Lemma 1), which leads to a
decrease in the total environmental damage. The former effect is compensated by the
latter effect. Thus, the subsidy has a positive effect on the environmental improve-
ment. In addition, if the public firm does not care for the environment, the subsidy
has no effect on the total output (see Lemma 2). The subsidy affects the total envir-
onmental damage only via the environmental R&D output. The subsidy will increase
the total environmental R&D (see Lemma 1), which leads to a decrease in the total
environmental damage.31
Lemma 4. In the mixed duopoly, (i) when the public firm cares for the environment,
the public firm’s profit increases (increases first and then decreases) with the subsidy if
the degree of spillover is small (large) enough, and the private firm’s profit (or the total
profit) increases with the subsidy; and (ii) when the public firm does not care for the
environment, the public firm’s profit does not depend on the subsidy, and the private
firm’s profit (or the total profit) increases with the subsidy.
Proof. See Appendix.
The intuition for this lemma is as follows. First, we consider the part (i) of the
lemma. If the public firm cares for the environment, the public firm’s output (or the
total output) increases and the private firm’s output decreases with the subsidy (see
Lemma 2). It follows that the price decreases and the public (private) firm’s produc-
tion cost increases (decreases) with the subsidy. This leads to a reduction in the pub-
lic (or private) firm’s gross profit with an increase of subsidy. Using Lemma 1, the
public (private) firm’s environmental R&D decreases (increases) with the subsidy. It
follows that the public (private) firm’s R&D cost also decreases (increases) with the
subsidy. In addition, it also follows that the subsidy received by the public firm
increases (increases first and then decreases) with the subsidy if the degree of spill-
over is small (large) enough, and the subsidy received by the private firm always
increases with the subsidy.
A firm’s profit equals the sum of its gross profit and subsidy it received net of its
R&D cost. For the public firm, if the degree of spillover is small enough, the increase
of subsidy it received and the decrease of R&D cost can compensate for the decrease
of gross profit. However, if both the degree of spillover and the subsidy rate are large,
the decrease of R&D cost can’t compensate for the decrease of gross profit and sub-
sidy it received. Thus, the public firm’s profit increases (increases and then decreases)
with the subsidy if the degree of spillover is small (large) enough. For the private
firm, the increase of subsidy it received can compensate for the decrease of gross
profit and the increases of R&D cost. Thus, the private firm’s profit increases with
the subsidy. Because the effect of subsidy on the total subsidy received by firms domi-
nates its effect on the total gross profit and the total R&D cost, the total profit
increases with the subsidy.
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Now, we turn to part (ii) of Lemma 4. If the public firm does not care for the
environment, the subsidy does not affect the firms’ output (see Lemma 2). It follows
that the subsidy does not affect the price and the firms’ production cost. Thus, the
subsidy also does not affect the firms’ gross profit. Since the public firm does not
invest in environmental R&D if it is unconcerned about the environment, the subsidy
does not affect the subsidy it received and its R&D cost. Thus, the public firm’s profit
does not depend on the subsidy. However, for the private firm, both the subsidy it
received and its R&D cost increase with the subsidy. Because the increase of subsidy
it received can compensate for the increase of its R&D cost, the private firm’s profit
increases with the subsidy. Obviously, the total profit also increases with the subsidy.
Lemma 5. In the mixed duopoly, regardless of whether the public firm cares about the
environment or not, the social welfare increases (decreases) with the subsidy if the sub-
sidy rate is small (large).
Proof. See Appendix.
This lemma implies that the relationship between the social welfare and the sub-
sidy rate is inverse U shape. The reason for the lemma is as follows. If the public
firm cares for the environment, with the increase of subsidy, consumer and producer
surpluses (or the total subsidy) increase and environmental damage decreases (see
Lemma 3).32 If the subsidy rate is small (large), the positive effect of subsidy on social
welfare (higher consumer surplus, higher producer surplus and lower environmental
damage) dominates (is dominated by) its negative effect on social welfare (higher
total subsidy). Thus, the social welfare increases (decreases) with the subsidy if the
subsidy rate is small (large).
In addition, if the public firm does not care for the environment, with the increase
of subsidy, consumer surplus does not change, producer surplus (or the total subsidy)
increases and environmental damage decreases. If the subsidy rate is small (large), the
positive effect of subsidy on social welfare (higher producer surplus and lower envir-
onmental damage) dominates (is dominated by) its negative effect on social welfare
(higher total subsidy). Thus, the social welfare increases (decreases) with the subsidy
if the subsidy rate is small (large).
4.3. R&D subsidy
In stage 1, the government sets the environmental R&D subsidy rate (s) to maximise













þ C0ðxt0Þ þ ð1þ bÞD0ðEtÞ
  oxt0
os
þ C0ðxt1Þ þ ð1þ bÞD0ðEtÞ
  oxt1
os
¼ ð1þ bÞsmð11þ 3kdÞ-s
ð11þ 3kdÞ ð11þ 3kdÞ2 þ kdð121þ 39kdÞð1þ bÞ2
 2 ¼ 0
(17)
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Note that expressions for - and s in (17) are too long and they are given in
the Appendix.
For k ¼ 1, combined with the first-order condition of firm 0 in the second stage,
equation (17) shows that the government sets s so as to equalise both firms’ environ-
mental R&D costs (i.e., C0ðxa0Þ ¼ C0ðxa1Þ).33 Using (11) and (17), we have





oX þ ð1þ bÞD0ðEaÞ. In addition, for k ¼ 0, the
government sets s so as to meet C0ðxb1Þ ¼ ð1þ bÞD0ðEbÞ.34 Combining with (11), we
have s ¼ ð1þ bÞD0ðEbÞ. Note that, Ea and Eb are shown in Footnote 31. Obviously,
the optimal subsidies may be different in cases (a) and (b) as the firms’ environmen-
tal R&D investments play an important (play no) role in changing the production
allocation if k ¼ 1 (k ¼ 0). Specifically, the subsidy can (cannot) change the produc-
tion allocation through the firms’ environmental R&D if k ¼ 1 (k ¼ 0). The change
of production allocation will affect consumer and producer surpluses, so that the sub-
sidy indirectly affects consumer and producer surpluses if k ¼ 1, whereas it does not
affect them if k ¼ 0. This may lead to the difference of optimal subsidies in cases (a)
and (b).
Solving (17) gives the optimal environmental R&D subsidy:
st ¼ ð1þ bÞsmð11þ 3kdÞ- (18)
Using (18), we can prove the following results.
Proposition 1. In the mixed duopoly, (i) sa>0 and sb>0; (ii) sa always increases with
b; and (iii) sb increases with b if d is small, whereas it may decrease with b if d
is large.
Proof. See Appendix.
Gil-Molto et al. (2006, 2011) examine the use of cost-reducing R&D subsidy in a
mixed market and also show that the optimal subsidy is positive. However, we find
that the optimal environmental R&D subsidy may decrease with spillovers when the
public firm does not care for the environment.35 This is different from the finding of
Gil-Molto et al. (2006, 2011), who think that the optimal subsidy always increases
with spillovers. Accordingly, when the government examines the effect of spillovers
on the R&D subsidy policy, it should distinguish the types of subsidy (a cost-reducing
R&D subsidy or an environmental R&D subsidy).36 In addition, Proposition 1 also
implies that, when the government investigates how the spillovers affect the environ-
mental R&D policy, it should consider the environmental concerns of firms and the
degree of environmental damage caused by production.
The economic explanation of this proposition is as follows. The result of part (i)
stems from the role that the environmental R&D subsidy plays in correcting two
types of market failures: (i) the under-investment in environmental R&D by private
firms;37 and (ii) the excess environmental damage caused by production (as defined
by Kato (2013)). From Lemmas 1 and 3, regardless of the public firm’s environmental
attitude, the environmental R&D subsidy really increases the total environmental
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R&D and decreases the total (or the marginal) environmental damage. Thus, the gov-
ernment should provide the subsidy to environmental R&D in both cases (a) and (b).
Next, we consider part (ii). When the public firm cares for the environment, the
spillovers always weaken the positive effect of the subsidy on the total environmental
R&D (denoted by the effect I of b),38 and strengthen (weaken) the negative effect of
the subsidy on the marginal damage if d is small or d is large and b is small (if both
d and b are large)39 (denoted by the effect II of b) (see Footnotes 28 and 31).
Obviously, when both d and b are large, the government should raise subsidy with
larger spillovers. In addition, when d is small or d is large and b is small, the effect I
of b exceeds the effect II of b. In this case, the government should also raise subsidy
as the spillovers increase. In summary, the optimal subsidy of the government
increases with the spillovers in case (a).
Finally, we explain part (iii). Unlike case (a), when the public firm does not care
for the environment, the spillovers do not change the effect of the subsidy on the
total environmental R&D (see Footnote 29),40 but it can change the negative effect of
the subsidy on the total (or the marginal) environmental damage (see Footnote 31).
To maximise the social welfare, the government sets the subsidy rate to equal
ð1þ bÞD0ðEbÞ. With an increase of b, 1þ b increases, while D0ðEbÞ decreases. The
effect of b on the marginal environmental damage is small if d is small. This leads to
an increase of ð1þ bÞD0ðEbÞ. Thus, the optimal subsidy increases with the spillovers
if d is small. However, if d is large, the effect of b on the marginal environmental
damage is large and may exceed it on 1þ b. In this case, ð1þ bÞD0ðEbÞ may decrease
as b increases. Thus, the optimal subsidy may decrease with the spillovers if d
is large.
We further compare the optimal subsidy of the government in cases (a) and (b),
and obtain the following result.
Proposition 2. In the mixed duopoly, sa is larger than sb if d is small, whereas sa may
be smaller than sb if d is large.
Proof. See Appendix.
This is an interesting result. On the surface, the government only needs to provide
a lower environmental R&D subsidy in case (a) than case (b) due to the public firm
investing more into environmental R&D if it cares about the environment than if it
does not. However, we show that the opposite appears if the seriousness of environ-
mental damage is small. This deserves the attention of policymakers. They can not
only determine the level of environmental R&D subsidy according to the environ-
mental attitude of firms in a mixed market, but also need to take into account other
factors such as the degree of environmental damage caused by production.
The intuition for Proposition 2 is as follows. The subsidy can decrease the total
environmental damage under both case (a) and case (b) (see Lemma 3). Moreover,
the subsidy can increase the total output if the public firm is concerned about the
environment (see Lemma 2), and therefore can also increase consumer surplus.
However, the subsidy does not impact consumer surplus if the public firm is uncon-
cerned about the environment. When d is small, the impact of subsidy on total
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environmental damage is also small. Thus, rendering investing in environmental
R&D is more socially profitable in case (a) than in case (b). However, when d is
large, the impact of subsidy on total environmental damage is also large. Since an
increase in the total output also increases the total emission (given X) in case (a), the
effect of subsidy on total environmental damage may be higher if the public firm
does not care for the environment than if it does. In this case, the marginal benefit
from subsidy in case (b) may exceed that in case (a).41
5. Private duopoly
In this section, the public firm is completely privatised (case c), i.e., both firm 0 and
firm 1 are private firms. They seek to maximise their own profits. The objective func-
tion for firm i is as shown in (3) when i ¼ 0, 1.
5.1. Production
In the third stage, the firms choose their outputs to maximise their revenue given in
(3). The corresponding first-order conditions are derived as:
opi
oqi
¼ PðQÞ þ P0ðQÞqiC0ðqiÞ ¼ mqj4qi ¼ 0, i ¼ 0, 1, i 6¼ j (19)
Solving (19) yields equilibrium outputs:










oX ¼ 0 (i ¼ 0, 1, i 6¼ j). This indicates
that in the private duopoly regime, each firm’s output does not depend on its (the
rival’s or the total) environmental R&D effort. Rather, the firms’ environmental R&D
investments play no role in changing the production allocation. Note that these
results are different from those in case (a), but they are similar to those in case (b).
5.2. R&D
In the second stage, each firm determines its environmental R&D level so as to maxi-
mise its profits. The first-order conditions are:
opiðx0, x1Þ
oxi
¼ sC0ðxiÞ ¼ sxi ¼ 0, i ¼ 0, 1 (21)
The above equation system shows that the firms’ environmental R&D behaviour
completely depends on the subsidy. Firm i conducts its R&D to maximise the pure
profits from investments (i.e., sxiCðxiÞ). In other words, the firm i’s optimal behav-
iour in R&D stage is characterised as:
3002 M. XING ET AL.
s ¼ C0ðxiÞ, i ¼ 0, 1 (22)
which indicates that firms themselves adjust their investments to be equalised.
Solving (21) gives equilibrium R&D levels:
xc0ðsÞ ¼ xc1ðsÞ ¼ s (23)
Note that to ensure the firms’ emissions are not negative, s must satisfy 0  s 
m
5ð1þbÞ in this section.
Now, substituting the above expressions for qci and x
c
i (i ¼ 0, 1) into (2), we obtain
the total environmental damage as follows:
DcðsÞ ¼ 2d
25
m5ð1þ bÞs½ 2 (24)
Lemma 6. In the private duopoly, each firm’s environmental R&D and the total envir-
onmental R&D output increase with the subsidy.
Proof. See Appendix.
In the private duopoly, the environmental R&D subsidy is a net inflow for both
firms. This lemma can be interpreted as follows. In (21), the term s is the marginal
benefit of firm i from environmental R&D and the term C0ðxiÞ is the marginal cost.
Since qci is independent from s (see (20)), an increase in s enhances the marginal
benefit to firm i. It follows that firm i conducts more environmental R&D.42
Note that, in the private duopoly (case (c)) the effect of subsidy on the firm 1’s
environmental R&D incentives is similar as in the mixed duopoly (cases (a) and (b)).
However, the effect of subsidy on the firm 0’s environmental R&D incentives is dif-
ferent from that in the mixed duopoly (case (a) and (b)). For example, the subsidy
catalyses the environmental R&D of firm 0 in case (c), but curbs (does not affect) its
environmental R&D in case (a) (case (b)). This implies that, privatisation may change
the effect form of subsidy on the public firm’s environmental R&D incentives.
Lemma 7. In the private duopoly, each firm’s output and the total output do not
depend on the subsidy.
Proof. See Appendix.
The reason is as follows. In the private duopoly, the environmental R&D subsidy
affects each firm’s output via the effect it exerts on the environmental R&D output.
However, the environmental R&D has no effect on each firm’s output (see (20)). It
follows that each firm’s output and the total output are not affected by the subsidy.
Note that, unlike this result, the subsidy can affect each firm’s output and the total
output in case (a).
Lemma 8. In the private duopoly, the total environmental damage decreases with
the subsidy.
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Proof. See Appendix.
The intuition for this result is as follows. In the private duopoly, the environmen-
tal R&D subsidy has no effect on the total output (see Lemma 7). Accordingly, the
subsidy affects the total environmental damage only through the environmental R&D
output. The subsidy increases the total environmental R&D (see Lemma 6), which
leads to a decrease in the total environmental damage.43 Thus, the subsidy has a posi-
tive effect on the environmental improvement.44
5.3. R&D subsidy
In the first stage, the government maximises the social welfare function by choosing
optimal subsidy. The first-order condition is as follows:
dSW
ds
¼ C0ðxc0Þ þ ð1þ bÞD0ðEcÞ
  oxc0
os









Symmetry of investments is ensured by the firms’ own optimal actions (see (22)).
This leads to the obvious policy recommendation that the government sets the sub-
sidy rate to meet:
C0ðx0Þ ¼ C0ðx1Þ ¼ ð1þ bÞD0ðEcÞ (26)
This comes from the limited role of environmental R&D in the sense that the
investments never influence the production allocation. In (26), Ec is shown in
Footnote 43.
Solving (25), we get the following optimal environmental R&D subsidy:
sc ¼ 2ð1þ bÞdm
5 1þ 2ð1þ bÞ2d
  (27)
Proposition 3. In the private duopoly, (i) sc>0; and (ii) sc increases with the spillovers
if d is small, whereas it decreases with the spillovers if d is large.
Proof. See Appendix.
The economic intuition is as follows. In the private duopoly, the subsidy increases
the total environmental R&D and decreases the total environmental damage (see
Lemmas 6 and 8). Thus, the subsidy can correct (or partly correct) the market fail-
ures (i) and (ii).45 In addition, the spillovers do not change the effect of subsidy on
total environmental R&D (see Footnote 42),46 but can change the effect of subsidy on
total (or marginal) environmental damage (see Footnote 43). In order to maximise
social welfare, the government sets the subsidy rate to equal ð1þ bÞD0ðEcÞ (see (26)).
With an increase of b, 1þ b increases but D0ðEcÞ decreases. Since the impact of b on
the marginal damage is small if d is small, this leads to an increase of ð1þ bÞD0ðEcÞ.
Thus, the optimal subsidy increases with b if d is small. However, the impact of b on
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the marginal damage is large if d is large and exceeds it on 1þ b. In this case, ð1þ
bÞD0ðEcÞ decreases as b increases. Thus, the optimal subsidy decreases with b if d
is large.
Combining Propositions 1 and 3, when the public firm does not care for the envir-
onment, the spillovers have a similar effect on the optimal subsidy in the cases of
mixed duopoly and private duopoly. However, when the public firm cares for the
environment, it may have a different effect on the optimal subsidy in the cases of
mixed duopoly and private duopoly. This implies that the public firm’s attitude
towards the environment is a critical factor determining the effect of privatisation on
the relationship between spillovers and environmental R&D subsidy policy.
6. Comparisons
In this section, we compare the optimal subsidy, total R&D, environmental damage,
welfare and others in the mixed duopoly (cases (a) and (b)) and in the private duop-
oly (case (c)) and further examine the effect of privatising the public firm on them.
Proposition 4. The optimal subsidy to environmental R&D in the mixed duopoly
(whether the public firm cares about the environment or not) is larger than in the pri-
vate duopoly (i.e., sa>sc and sb>sc).
In other words, privatisation of the public firm leads to a decrease in the optimal
subsidy, regardless of the public firm’s attitude to the environment. The policy impli-
cation of this proposition is obvious. The privatisation policy of the government can
affect its environmental R&D subsidy policy. The government should lower the envir-
onmental R&D subsidy rate accordingly if it intends to implement the privatisation
policy in a polluting industry.
The reason for Proposition 4 is as follows. It is easy to compare the optimal sub-
sidy in cases (a) and (c). In the latter case, the task that the government should
undertake is only to equalise the social marginal cost of environmental R&D and the
marginal environmental damage, because symmetry of investments is ensured by the
firms’ own optimal actions. On the other hand, it follows from a comparison between
the firm 1’s first-order conditions in cases (a) and (c) (see (11) and (21)) that firm 1
has less incentive to conduct environmental R&D in case (a) than in case (c) because
of the term P0ðQaÞqa1 oq
a
0
oX <0. Thus, compared to case (c), the government must raise
the subsidy rate to ensure C0ðx0Þ ¼ C0ðx1Þ in case (a).
Now, we consider the optimal subsidy in cases (b) and (c). The government sets
the subsidy rate to meet s ¼ ð1þ bÞD0ðEÞ in both case (b) and case (c). Since the
total output is more in case (b) than in case (c),47 subsidising R&D in case (b) is
more socially profitable than in case (c). Thus, the optimal subsidy of the government
is larger in case (b) than in case (c).
Lemma 9. When the optimal subsidy to environmental R&D is provided, there are: (i)
Xa>Xc; (ii) Qa>Qc; and (iii) PSa<ð>ÞPSc if d is small (large).
The reason for this lemma is as follows. We first consider part (i). Since the public
firm which cares for the environment maximises the social welfare but not its profits,
it invests more and produces more in case (a) than when it is privatised in case (c)
ECONOMIC RESEARCH-EKONOMSKA ISTRAZIVANJA 3005
(i.e., xa0js¼sa>xc0js¼sc and qa0js¼sa>qc0js¼sc). The private firm invests more in case (a)
than in case (c) (i.e., xa1js¼sa>xc1js¼sc) because of higher subsidy rate in the mixed
duopoly (see Proposition 4). It follows that privatisation of the public firm which
cares for the environment leads to a decrease in the total environmental R&D.
Now, turn to part (ii) of the lemma. The private firm produces less in case (a)
than in case (c) (i.e., qa1js¼sa<qc1js¼sc) because of weaker competition in the private
duopoly. However, the effect of privatisation on the public firm’s output dominates
that on the private firm’s output. Thus, privatisation of the public firm which cares
for the environment reduces the total output.48
Finally, we interpret part (iii). The private firm produces more and achieves more
profit in case (c) than in case (a) (i.e., pa1js¼sa<pc1js¼sc) because of weaker competition
in case (c), whereas whether the public firm achieves more profit or not in case (a)
than where it is privatised in case (c) depends on d.49 If d is small, the environmental
damage caused by production is slight and the difference of the optimal subsidy in
cases (a) and (c) is small. Since the public firm is more concerned about its profit in
case (c) than in case (a), it achieves more profit in case (c). It follows that privatisa-
tion of the public firm raises the total profit. However, if d is large, the environmental
damage caused by production is serious and the optimal subsidy is much higher in
case (a) than in case (c). Since the public firm can obtain much more subsidy in case
(a) than in case (c), it achieves much more profit in case (a). Although the private
firm achievev less profit in case (a), the higher profit achieved by the public firm can
compensate this if d is large enough. Thus, the total profit is higher in case (a) than
in case (c) if d is large.
Lemma 10. When the optimal subsidy to environmental R&D is provided, there are:
(i) Xb<Xc; (ii) Qb>Qc; and (iii) PSb<PSc.
The intuition behind this lemma is as follows. We begin by taking into account
part (i). If the public firm does not care for the environment, the subsidy does not
affect its environmental R&D behaviour and thus it does not invest in case (b) (see
(12)). However, the subsidy can stimulate R&D investment by the private firm in
both case (b) and case (c) because it is a net inflow for a private firm. The public
firm obviously invests less in case (b) than it is, privatised, in case (c) (i.e.,
xb0js¼sb<xc0js¼sc), but the private firm invests more in case (b) than in case (c) (i.e.,
xb1js¼sb>xc1js¼sc) because of higher subsidy rate in the mixed duopoly. Since more R&D
by the public firm can compensate less R&D by the private firm in case (c), privatisa-
tion of the public firm raises the total environmental R&D. This is different from the
result that privatisation leads to reductions in total R&D under the environmental tax
policy (Haruna & Goel, 2019).50 Combining part (i) of Lemmas 9 and 10, we find
that the effect of privatisation on the total environmental R&D depends on the public
firm’s attitude towards the environment.
Next, consider part (ii) of the lemma. Similar reasons as in part (ii) of Lemma 9,
privatisation of the public firm which does not care for the environment also
decreases the total output.
Finally, we give an explanation of part (iii). The private firm achieves more profit
in case (c) than in case (b) (i.e., pb1js¼sb<pc1js¼sc) because of weaker competition in
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case (c). In addition, if the public firm does not care for the environment, it also
achieves more profit in case (c) than in case (b). It follows that privatisation of the
public firm raises the total profit. Note that this is different from the result in the
case where the public firm cares for the environment.
Proposition 5. When the optimal subsidy to environmental R&D is provided, there
are: (i) Da>Dc and Db>Dc; and (ii) SWa>SWc and SWb>ð<ÞSWc if d is
small (large).
This proposition implies that under a policy of providing optimal subsidy to envir-
onmental R&D, privatisation of the public firm leads to a decline in environmental
damage despite its environmental attitude. This is different from the result that pri-
vatisation may damage the environment under the environmental tax policy (Pal &
Saha, 2015; Tsai et al., 2016; Xu et al., 2016; Haruna & Goel, 2019). However,
whether privatisation reduces or raises social welfare may depend on the public firm’s
environmental attitude and the seriousness of environmental damage. Privatisation
always reduces social welfare if the public firm cares for the environment, whereas it
raises social welfare if the public firm is unconcerned for the environment and the
seriousness of environmental damage is large. This is different from the result of Gil-
Molto et al. (2006, 2011), who show that under a policy of providing optimal subsidy
to cost-reducing R&D, privatisation always induces a decline in social welfare.
Proposition 5 suggests that, when the government investigates the effect of privatisa-
tion on environmental damage and social welfare in polluting industries, it should
take into account the environmental attitude of public firms and the seriousness of
environmental damage.
The reason for this proposition is as follows. We first consider part (i). Although
the total environmental R&D is more in case (a) than in case (c), the total output is
also higher in the former case (see Lemma 9). For given output, an increase in the
total R&D can reduce the total emissions. However, the reduction of emissions (due
to the increase of total R&D) cannot compensate for the rise of emissions (caused by
the increase of total output) in case (a). Thus, the total emissions are higher in case
(a) than in case (c) (i.e., Eajs¼sa>Ecjs¼sc). It follows that the total environmental dam-
age is higher in case (a) than in case (c). In addition, the total environmental R&D is
less in case (b) than in case (c), whereas the total output is higher in the former case
(see Lemma 10). Thus, the total emissions are higher in case (b) than in case (c).
This leads to lower total environmental damage in the private duopoly.
Secondly, turn to part (ii) of proposition 5. Privatisation of the public firm, regard-
less of its attitude to the environment, will lead to lower total output (and thus lower
consumer surplus) (see Lemmas 9 and 10) and lower total environmental damage. In
addition, privatisation leads to higher (lower) producer surplus if the public firm
cares for the environment and d is small (large) (see Lemma 9) and it leads to higher
producer surplus if the public firm does not care for the environment (see Lemma
10). If the public firm cares for the environment and d is small, the negative effect
(lower consumer surplus) dominates the positive effect (lower total environmental
damage and higher producer surplus). If the public firm cares for the environment
and d is large, the negative effect (lower consumer and producer surpluses) dominates
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the positive effect (lower total environmental damage). It follows that privatisation of
the public firm which is concerned about the environment will reduce the social wel-
fare. However, if the public firm does not care for the environment, whether the
negative effect (lower consumer surplus) dominates the positive effect (lower total
environmental damage and higher producer surplus) or not depends on d. It tran-
spires that the negative effect dominates (does not dominate) the positive effect when
d is small (large). Thus, privatisation of the public firm which is unconcerned about
the environment will reduce (raise) the social welfare if d is small (large).
7. Conclusions
The theory of mixed oligopoly with environmental policy issues has attracted much
interest recently. This study examines the use of subsidy to environmental R&D in a
mixed duopoly market. Firstly, we consider the following two scenarios with regard
to the public firm’s attitude towards environment – one in which the public firm
cares about the environment (case (a)) and the other where it does not (case (b)). We
show that the optimal subsidy is positive and always increases with spillovers in case
(a), whereas it may decrease with spillovers in case (b). Moreover, whether it is larger
or smaller in case (a) than in case (b) depends on the seriousness of the environmen-
tal damage. We also examine the effect of the subsidy on the environmental R&D
incentives and find that the subsidy does not always promote all firms’ R&D. For
example, the public firm’s R&D decreases with (does not depend on) the subsidy in
case (a) (case (b)). In addition, we analyse how the subsidy affects the total R&D and
environmental damage, and find that the use of subsidy leads to an increase in total
R&D and a decrease in environmental damage in both case (a) and case (b).
Secondly, we consider the case where the public firm is completely privatised (case
(c)) and explore the effect of privatisation on the optimal subsidy, total R&D, envir-
onmental damage and welfare. We find that privatisation leads to a decrease of the
optimal subsidy no matter how the public firm treats environmental damage. In add-
ition, when the optimal subsidy is provided, privatisation lowers the environmental
damage regardless of the public firm’s environmental attitude. However, whether it
reduces or raises the total R&D and welfare relies on the public firm’s attitude to the
environment.
This study uses a simplest framework to examine the optimal environmental R&D
subsidy in a mixed duopoly. Several extensions of this analysis are possible: (i) we
only consider the Cournot duopolistic competition model in this paper. An extension
is that we also analyse the optimal subsidy under Bertrand competition and compare
them in quantity and price competition;51 (ii) we assume that the environmental con-
cern of the public firm is exogenous. We can extend this study to examine the opti-
mal subsidy if it is endogenous; (iii) with the increase of environmental awareness,
more consumers prefer to buy environmentally friendly products. This stimulates
firms to carry out more environmental R&D investments in polluting industries.
Thus, an extension is that we study the environmental R&D subsidy policy by consid-
ering environmental awareness; (iv) this study can be extended to the case where
public and private firms compete in the foreign market while cooperating in the
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domestic market or where a domestic public (private) firm competes with a private
(public) foreign firm.52 However, these extensions require much effort and are tasks
that remain for future research.
Notes
1. Some researches have reported that, from the beginning of 20th century to the present,
the average temperature of the earth’s surface has increased by about 1.1f (0.6 C); in the
past 40 years, the average temperature has risen by about 0.5f (0.2–0.3 C); in 20th
century, the degree of global warming was more than in any period of the past
400–600 years.
2. For example, public firms coexist with private firms in many highly polluting industries
(such as mining, petrochemicals, textiles and clothing, biomedicine, metal and non-
metal) in China (Chang et al., 2015).
3. Environmental R&D information disclosure, technology imitation, researchers flow and
technology exchange of polluting firms will lead to environmental R&D spillovers.
4. See the related studies of Lambertini, Poyago-Theotoky, and Tampieri, (2017) and
Furkova and Chocholata (2017).
5. State-owned pulp and paper firms have higher pollution intensities than private firms in
Indonesia, Bangladesh and Thailand (see Hettige et al., 1996).
6. This is the case in China’s steel, coal, textile, power and other industries.
7. The public firm’s attitude towards the environment affects its environmental R&D
behaviour and indirectly affects its rival’s R&D behaviour in a mixed duopoly.
Accordingly, the government should take into account the public firm’s concern for
environment when making subsidy polices for environmental R&D. Pal and Saha (2015)
distinguish the public firm’s environmental attitudes when investigating the relationship
between privatisation and environmental damage. However, their study does not involve
the environmental R&D subsidy policy.
8. When analysing the effect of cost-reducing R&D subsidy on the private firm’s R&D and
total R&D in a mixed oligopoly, Gil-Molto et al. (2006; 2011; 2018) and Lee et al. (2017)
obtain a similar result. However, their studies do not involve the environmental R&D
subsidy and the public firm’s environmental concerns.
9. This is different from the result that the cost-reducing R&D subsidy may increase the
public firm’s R&D in a mixed duopoly (Gil-Molto et al., 2006, 2011; Lee, Muminov, &
Tomaru, 2017).
10. The R&D subsidies are the second largest type of government aid to industry in OECD
countries (Nezu, 1997).
11. Note that the environmental policy in markets where all firms are privately owned has
been analyzed by many scholars (such as Barrett, 1994; Markusen, Morey, & Olewiler,
1995; Ulph, 1996; Hoel, 1997; Eerola, 2006; Chappin, Vermeulen, Meeus, & Hekkert,
2009; Barcena-Ruiz & Garzon, 2013; and Moore, Porten, Plummer, Brandes, & Baird,
2014). However, they do not consider environmental policy in mixed markets where
public and private firms coexist.
12. The inclusion of a quadratic term in firm’s cost function is standard in the literature on
mixed oligopoly (Zikos, 2007; Heywood & Ye, 2009; Gil-Molto et al., 2011; Andree, 2013;
Nie, 2014; Naya, 2015).
13. Note that the objective of a firm who invests in cost-reducing R&D is to lower its
marginal cost of production (Zikos, 2007; Gil-Molto et al., 2006, 2011). However, the
objective of a firm which invests in environmental R&D is to reduce its emissions
(Poyago-Theotoky, 2007; Ouchida & Goto, 2014). Unlike the cost-reducing R&D, the
environmental R&D (e.g., the R&D for end-of-pipe technology) does not necessarily
improve productive efficiency.
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14. There are generally two emission-reducing technologies in the existing literature: end-of-
pipe and clean technologies (Skea, 2000; Requate, 2005; Tsai, Tu, & Chiou, 2015; Tsai
et al., 2016).
15. Poyago-theotoky (2007) and Ouchida and Goto (2014) also consider the spillover effect
in environmental R&D activity.
16. This form of environmental damage function is also employed by Poyago-theotoky
(2007), Naito and Ogawa (2009), Pal and Saha (2015), Ouchida (2016) and others.
17. Pal and Saha (2015) call it the increment in marginal environmental damage due
to pollution.
18. We assume that 0<d<0:64. This assumption ensures that the emissions for firms are not
negative and we can obtain interior solutions in all three cases (cases (a), (b) and (c)),
irrespective of the degree of spillovers.
19. Unlike the existing studies on cost-reducing R&D subsidy (Gil-Molto et al., 2011), the
main purpose of the government subsidising environmental R&D is to promote firms to
carry out environmental R&D investments and improve environmental quality.
20. This study assumes that the regulator does not impose environmental taxes. This
simplifying assumption has the purpose to show the only effect of R&D subsidy on the
environmental R&D, output and environmental damage.
21. The objective divergence between the public firms and the government is analyzed by
Ohori (2006), Wang and Wang (2009), Kato (2010) and Pal and Saha (2015).
22. Pal and Saha (2015) have adopted a similar method in the construction of the public
firm’s objective function. However, they consider the environmental tax policy but not
the environmental R&D subsidy policy.
23. Note that the subsidy to environmental R&D cancels out in the public firm’s objective
function (see (5)). It follows that the subsidy has no direct effect on the public firm’s
environmental R&D or output behavior. However, it can indirectly affect the public
firm’s environmental R&D and output through its effect on the private firm’s R&D
behavior. Gil-Molto et al. (2011) give a similar analysis when they explain the technical
efficiency of cost-reducing R&D subsidy.
24. Note that this study assumes a>c.
25. Using (6) and (7), we derive the reaction functions of firms in output stage: q0ðq1Þ ¼
½mþ kdð1þ bÞðx1 þ x0Þð1þ kdÞq1=ð3þ kdÞ and q1ðq0Þ ¼ ðmq0Þ=4. Obviously, an
increase of q0 (q1) will lead to a decrease of q1 (q0).
26. Gil-Molto et al. (2006, 2011) examine the impact of R&D subsidy on cost-reducing R&D
in a mixed market and find that the public firm’s R&D increases with the subsidy if the
degree of spillovers is large. Obviously, their result is different from the result when we
consider the subsidy to environmental R&D.
27. According to (10) and (11), we obtain the following reaction functions of two firms in
R&D stage: x0ðx1Þ ¼ ½kdð53þ 19kdÞð1þ bÞmkdð121þ 43kdÞð1þ bÞ2x1=½kdð121þ
43kdÞð1þ bÞ2 þ ð11þ 3kdÞ2
and x1ðx0Þ ¼ ½ð11þ 3kdÞ2s4kdð2þ kdÞð1þ bÞmþ 4k2d2ð1þ bÞ2x0=½ð11þ 3kdÞ2  4k2d2ð1þ bÞ2.
28. Because ojoxa0ðsÞ=osj=ob ¼ 2dð121þ 43dÞð11þ 3dÞ2ð1þ bÞ=½ð11þ 3dÞ2 þ dð121þ 39dÞð1þ bÞ22>0,
ojoxa1ðsÞ=osj=ob ¼ 8d2ð11þ 3dÞ2ð1þ bÞ=½ð11þ 3dÞ2 þ dð121þ 39dÞð1þ bÞ22>0 and
ojo½xa0ðsÞ þ xa1ðsÞ=osj=ob ¼ 2dð11þ 3dÞ2ð121þ 39dÞð1þ bÞ=½ð11þ 3dÞ2 þ dð121þ 39dÞð1þ bÞ22<0,
the spillovers strengthen the negative (positive) effect of s on xa0ðsÞ (xa1ðsÞ) and weaken
the positive effect of s on xa0ðsÞ þ xa1ðsÞ.
29. Because ojoxb0ðsÞ=osj=ob ¼ ojoxb1ðsÞ=osj=ob ¼ ojo½xb0ðsÞ þ xb1ðsÞ=osj=ob ¼ 0, the spillovers
do not change the effect of s on xb0ðsÞ, xb1ðsÞ and xb0ðsÞ þ xb1ðsÞ.
30. According to (2), an increase in total environmental R&D output leads to a decrease in
environmental damage caused by increased unit production. Moreover, the social welfare
increases as the total environmental damage decreases. Thus, from the view point of
social welfare, the public firm will increase its output if the total environmental R&D
output increases.
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31. EtðsÞ ¼ qt0ðsÞ þ qt1ðsÞð1þ bÞ½xt0ðsÞ þ xt1ðsÞ (t ¼ a, b). Combining with (12), (13), (14)
and (15), we can obtain EaðsÞ ¼ f5½ð11þ 3dÞ þ 2dð1þ bÞ2m11ð1þ bÞð11þ
3dÞsg=½ð11þ 3dÞ2 þ dð121þ 39dÞð1þ bÞ2 and EbðsÞ ¼ ½5m11ð1þ bÞs=11. Using (16),
we have DaðsÞ ¼ dðEaðsÞÞ2=2 and DbðsÞ ¼ dðEbðsÞÞ2=2. The marginal environmental
damage is given by dEaðsÞ (dEbðsÞ) in case (a) (case (b)). We get ojoEaðsÞ=osj=ob>ð<Þ0
if 0<d< 22 ﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃ127p 209 =1470:2648 or d> 22 ﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃ127p 209 =147 and
b<
ﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃ
ð11 þ 3dÞ2=½dð121þ 39dÞ
q
1 (if d> 22 ﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃ127p 209 =147 and b> ﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃð11 þ 3dÞ2=½dð121 þ 39dÞq 1).
It follows that the spillovers strengthen (weaken) the negative effect of s on EaðsÞ,
dEaðsÞ and DaðsÞ if d is small or d is large and b is small (if both d and b are large). In
addition, we obtain ojoEbðsÞ=osj=ob>0. Thus, the spillovers strengthen the negative
effect of s on EbðsÞ, dEbðsÞ and DbðsÞ.
32. Because the total output (the total environmental R&D) increases with s (see Lemmas 1
and 2), consumer surplus (the total subsidy) also increases with s.
33. C0ðxa0Þ ¼ C0ðxa1Þ because of dSW=ds ¼ f½P0ðQaÞqa1D0ðEaÞ oq
a
1
oX C0ðxa1Þ þ ð1þ
bÞD0ðEaÞg oxa1os ¼ ½C0ðxa0ÞC0ðxa1Þ
oxa1
os ¼ 0 and
oxa1
os >0 in case (a).
34. C0ðxb1Þ ¼ ð1þ bÞD0ðEbÞ because of dSW=ds ¼ ½C0ðxb1Þ þ ð1þ bÞD0ðEbÞ ox
b
1
os ¼ 0 and
oxb1
os >0 in case (b).
35. For example, sb decreases with b in interval ½0:5, 1 if d  0:5.
36. The cost-reducing R&D subsidy can change the production allocation through the firms’
R&D. This change will affect consumer and producer surpluses, so that the subsidy
indirectly affects the social welfare (see Gil-Molto et al., 2011). However, this subsidy
cannot change the social welfare through the environmental damage as the
environmental R&D subsidy does. This may lead to different results under the two types
of subsidy.
37. Private firms do not take into account the decrease in environmental damage as a
consequence of the investment on environmental R&D (as environmental damage does
not belong to their objective function). This will rest in underinvestment in
environmental R&D. Ulph (1999) defines the R&D undervaluation effect. However, he
does not consider the environmental damage.
38. This means that, the larger the b, the weaker the effect of the R&D subsidy on correcting
market failure (i).
39. This means that, if d is small or d is large and b is small (if both d and b are large), the
larger the b, the stronger (weaker) the effect of the R&D subsidy on correcting market
failure (ii).
40. This means that the effect of the subsidy on correcting the market failure (i) does not
depend on b.
41. In addition, we compare the welfare (environmental damage) in cases (a) and (b) and
find that when the optimal subsidy is provided, the welfare (environmental damage) is
higher (lower) if the public firm cares for the environment than if it does not.
42. Because ojoxc0ðsÞ=osj=ob ¼ ojoxc1ðsÞ=osj=ob ¼ ojo½xc0ðsÞ þ xc1ðsÞ=osj=ob ¼ 0, the spillovers
do not change the positive effect of s on xc0ðsÞ, xc1ðsÞ and xc0ðsÞ þ xc1ðsÞ.
43. Using (20) and (23), we obtain EcðsÞ ¼ qc0 þ qc1ð1þ bÞ½xc0ðsÞ þ xc1ðsÞ
¼ 2½m5ð1þ bÞs=5. According to (24), we get DcðsÞ ¼ dðEcðsÞÞ2=2. The marginal
environmental damage is given by dEcðsÞ. Because ojoEcðsÞ=osj=ob ¼ 2>0, the spillovers
strengthen the negative effect of s on EcðsÞ. Thus, the spillovers also strengthen the
negative effect of s on dEcðsÞ and DcðsÞ.
44. Substituting (20) and (23) into (3) and (4) and then taking comparative statics on the
profits and welfare, we find that each firm’s profit and the total profit increase with the
subsidy, and the relationship between the welfare and the subsidy is inverse U shape
(given 0<d<0:64, 0  b  1 and 0  s  m=½5ð1þ bÞ).
45. The market failure (i) is the under-investment in environmental R&D by firms and the
market failure (ii) is the excess environmental damage caused by production.
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46. This means that the effect of the subsidy on correcting the market failure (i) does not
depend on b.
47. This is because ðqb0 þ qb1Þjs¼sb ¼ 5m=11>2m=5 ¼ ðqc0 þ qc1Þjs¼sc .
48. It follows that privatisation of the public firm which cares for the environment lowers
consumer surplus (i.e., CSajs¼sa>CScjs¼sc ).
49. If d is small (large), pa0js¼sa<ð>Þpc0js¼sc .
50. In addition, Gil-Molto et al. (2011) consider the effect of privatisation on cost-reducing
R&D and show that privatisation always reduces the total cost-reducing R&D. This is
different from our result.
51. Chen and Nie (2014) study duopoly innovation under both Cournot and Bertrand
competition.
52. See the related studies of Zhang, Zhong, and Mei (2016), Cieslik (2016) and Wang and
Chiou (2016).
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Appendix
A. Proof of Lemma 1: Because ox
a
0ðsÞ



















B. Proof of Lemma 2: Because oq
a
0ðsÞ
os ¼ 4dð11þ3dÞð1þbÞð11þ3dÞ2þdð121þ39dÞð1þbÞ2 >0,
oqa1ðsÞ
os ¼  dð11þ3dÞð1þbÞð11þ3dÞ2þdð121þ39dÞð1þbÞ2 <0,
o½qa0ðsÞþqa1ðsÞ







3014 M. XING ET AL.
C. Proof of Lemma 3: Because oD
aðsÞ





os ¼  dð1þbÞ½5m11ð1þbÞs11 <0.
D. Proof of Lemma 4: Substituting (12), (13), (14) and (15) into (3), we obtain pt0ðsÞ and







os are linear functions of s.
opa0ðsÞ
os js¼s>0 for all b 2 ½0, 1 and
opa0ðsÞ
os js¼s>ð<Þ0 if b is
small (large) enough. Thus, if b is small enough, op
a
0ðsÞ
os >0 for all s 2 ½s,s. However, if b is
large enough, there exists a ~s 2 ðs,sÞ making that opa0ðsÞos >ð<Þ0 for all s 2 ðs,~sÞ(s 2 ð~s,sÞ). It fol-
lows that in interval ½s,s, pa0ðsÞ increases (increases first and then decreases) with s if b is













os >0 for all s 2 ½s,s. It follows that pa1ðsÞ and pa0ðsÞ þ








os ¼ s  0.
E. Proof of Lemma 5: Substituting (12), (13), (14) and (15) into (4), we obtain SWtðsÞ
(t ¼ a, b). Obviously, oSWtðsÞos is a linear function of s. Because oSW
tðsÞ
os js¼s>0 and oSW
tðsÞ
os js¼s<0,
there exists a s^ 2 ðs,sÞ making that oSWtðsÞos >ð<Þ0 for all s 2 ðs, s^Þ(s 2 ð^s,sÞ). It follows that
SWtðsÞ increases (decreases) with s if s 2 ðs, s^Þ(s 2 ð^s,sÞ).





os ¼ 1>0 and
o½xc0ðsÞþxc1ðsÞ
os ¼ 2>0.








H. Proof of Lemma 8: Because oD
cðsÞ
os ¼  4dð1þbÞ½m5ð1þbÞs5 <0.
I. Proof of Proposition 1: (i) Because m ¼ ac>0, 0  b  1 and 0<d<0:64, sa>0 and
sb>0; (ii) Because os
a






11½1þdð1þbÞ22 >ð<Þ0 if d<ð>Þ 1ð1þbÞ2.
J. Proof of Proposition 2: sa>sb if d is small because of sasb>0 for 0<d  0:04 and
0  b  1. In addition, we can prove sasb<0 for 0:2  d<0:64 and 0  b  0:9. Thus, sa
may be smaller that sb if d is large.




5½1þ2ð1þbÞ2d2 >ð<Þ0 if d<ð>Þ 12ð1þbÞ2.
L. Expressions of - and s: - ¼ ð½ð11þ 3kdÞ2ð43k2d2 þ 121dÞ þ k2d2ð121þ 43kdÞ2ð1þ
bÞ2ð1þ bÞ2 þ ½ð11þ 3kdÞ2 þ kdð121þ 43kdÞð1þ bÞ22Þ
and
s ¼
ð11þ 3kdÞfð19k2d22kdþ 55dÞð11þ 3kdÞ2 þ 2kd½48k3d3 þ 143k2d2 þ ð165d121Þkdþ
605dð1þ bÞ2g þ k2d2ð121þ 43kdÞ½ð53þ 19kdÞð11þ 3kdÞ þ 8kdð11þ 4kdÞð1þ bÞ2ð1þ bÞ2
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